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Abstract
Time-inconsistency is an essential feature of many policy problems (Kydland and Prescott,
1977). This paper presents and compares three methods for computing Markov-perfect opti-
mal policies in stochastic nonlinear business cycle models. The methods considered include
value function iteration, generalized Euler-equations, and parameterized shadow prices. In
the context of a business cycle model in which a scal authority chooses government spending
and income taxation optimally, while lacking the ability to commit, we show that the solutions
obtained using value function iteration and generalized Euler equations are somewhat more
accurate than that obtained using parameterized shadow prices. Among these three methods,
we show that value function iteration can be applied easily, even to environments that include
a risk-sensitive scal authority and/or inequality constraints on government spending. We
show that the risk-sensitive scal authority lowers government spending and income-taxation,
reducing the disincentive households face to accumulate wealth.
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1 Introduction
Governments are confronted routinely with important policy decisions, not least with decisions
regarding spending and taxation (i.e., scal policy) and about how to set a policy interest rate
(i.e., monetary policy). Following Kydland and Prescott (1977) it is now well-known that,
when private agents are forward-looking and rational, optimal policies are (invariably) not time-
consistent and that time-consistent policies are (invariably) not optimal. Absent a commitment
technology, attention focuses naturally on policies that are time-consistent or, more specically,
on equilibria that are Markov-perfect and this focus has led to a large literature on discre-
tionary policymaking. While there are notable exceptions, the vast bulk of this literature
computes equilibrium using what is essentially linear-quadratic dynamic programming with the
policy problem approximated to have the required linear constraints and quadratic objective.
Although some policy problems can conceivably be well-approximated by linear constraints and
second-order accurate welfare approximations, such as policy problems for which the steady state
is e¢ cient, and for other problems, such as those where the model has many state variables,
only linear-quadratic methods may be feasible, for many interesting problems, such as prob-
lems involving distortionary taxes and/or imperfect competition, rst-order accuracy cannot be
obtained through linear-quadratic methods. Moreover, some model characteristics, like occasion-
ally binding constraints, call out for nonlinear solution methods even when the policy objective is
quadratic (Adam and Billi, 2007; Nakata, 2012). Fortunately, it is becoming increasingly feasible
to analyze discretionary policymaking without turning to the linear-quadratic toolkit.
In this paper we present and compare three strategies for computing Markov-perfect optimal
policies in nonlinear stochastic business cycle models. These strategies apply to economies
populated by a large number of atomistic private agents and by a benevolent government, tasked
with conducting policy in order to maximize the welfare of the representative household. The
solution strategies include value function iteration, policy function iteration on generalized Euler
equations, and parameterized shadow prices. To illustrate the three strategies we apply them
to the canonical dynamic model of scal policy taken from Klein, Krusell, and Ríos-Rull (2008),
augmented to include an transitory aggregate technology shock and extended to allow for capital
depreciation (as per Ambler and Pelgrin, 2010). In this model, government spending provides
households with utility and the scal authoritys problem is to choose government spending
optimally, subject to a balanced-budget constraint, while lacking both a commitment technology
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and the ability to impose lump-sum taxes. This balanced-budget scal policy model provides the
ideal environment in which to illustrate the methods because this model, or closely related models,
have been studied by Stockman (2001), Benhabib and Rustichini (1997), Klein and Ríos-Rull
(2003), Ortigueira (2006), Klein, Krusell, and Ríos-Rull (2008), and Ambler and Pelgrin (2010).
However, with the exception of Ambler and Pelgrin (2010), each of these studies has looked only
at deterministic specications and/or focused only on the models steady state behavior.1
For the canonical scal policy model we nd that value function iteration and the generalized
Euler equations solution method, both employing Chebyshev polynomials for function approxima-
tion and Gauss-Hermite quadrature for integration, perform well and are notably more accurate in
terms of Euler-equation errors than the parameterized shadow prices solution approach, which is
based on parameterized expectations and uses Monte Carlo integration. We extend the canonical
model to allow for a risk-sensitive scal authority and for an inequality constraint on government
spending as a share of output and show how the equilibrium of these models can be computed eas-
ily, and relatively accurately, using the value function iteration solution method. We show that
the risk-sensitive scal authority cuts government spending in order to reduce income taxation
and thereby mitigate the disincentive on household capital accumulation.
Our paper is related to several others. In particular, we take our main model a balanced-
budget scal policy problem from Ambler and Pelgrin (2010), who show how a method of
parameterized expectations can be used to compute its time-consistent equilibrium. Our use of
Chebyshev polynomials for approximating functions is shared by a number of studies, including
Ortigueira (2006), Niemann, Pichler, and Sorger (2008, 2009), Ortigueira, Pereira, and Pichler
(2012), and Anderson, Kim, and Yun (2010). Our paper is also related to the important literature
on discretionary policymaking in linear-quadratic models, and to the computational strategies of
Kydland and Prescott (1977), Oudiz and Sachs (1985), Currie and Levine (1985, 1993), Backus
and Dri¢ ll (1986), Söderlind (1999), and Dennis (2007).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes a simple balanced-
budget business cycle model of scal policy. This model is interesting in its own right and
usefully serves as a vehicle for illustrating and comparing the various solution strategies. Section
3 presents the three solution strategies. Section 4 applies the various solution strategies to solve
1Benhabib and Rustichini (1997), Domínguez (2007), and Ortigueira, Pereira, and Pichler (2012) consider
related models in which the scal authoritys balanced-budget restriction is relaxed. But these studies, too, focus
on deterministic models.
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the scal policy model for its Markov-perfect equilibrium. Section 5 shows how features such as
occasionally binding constraints and risk-sensitivity can be accommodated. Section 6 discusses
computation times and the application of these methods to larger models. Section 7 o¤ers
concluding remarks.
2 The model
We consider a production economy populated by a unit-mass of identical atomistic households,
a unit-mass of identical atomistic rms, and a scal authority. Firms rent capital and hire
labor from households and use these inputs to produce goods that are sold to households and the
scal authority. Goods sold to the scal authority are transformed costlessly into a government
consumption good while those sold to households are either consumed or used to augment the
capital stock. The scal authority taxes household income, using the revenue to nance the
provision of the government consumption good. Markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive.
This model follows Ambler and Pelgrin (2010) and extends Klein, Krusell, and Ríos-Rull (2008).
2.1 Households
Households own the capital stock. They receive income by renting their capital and supplying
their labor to rms at prices rt and wt, respectively. After paying income tax, households use
their remaining income to purchase goods, which they use to o¤set capital-depreciation, to invest
in their capital stock, and to consume. The representative households lifetime utility function
is described by
E
1X
t=0
tu (ct; Gt) ; (1)
where  2 (0; 1) is the discount factor, ct denotes private consumption, Gt denotes government
consumption goods, and the momentary utility function u (ct; Gt) is assumed to be strictly increas-
ing, strictly concave, twice continuously di¤erentiable, and to satisfy the Inada (1963) conditions.
The capital owned by the representative household evolves over time according to
kt+1 + ct = kt + (1   t) [(rt   ) kt + wt] ; (2)
where  2 (0; 1) is the depreciation rate,  t > 0 is the tax rate applied to household income
(with a tax-allowance for capital-depreciation), and kt is the households stock of capital as of the
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beginning of period t. Households maximize their expected lifetime utility, (1), subject to their
ow-budget constraint, (2), taking prices, taxes, and government consumption goods as given.
2.2 Firms
Our stand-in aggregate rm employs capital and labor to produce output according to the neo-
classical production technology
Yt = e
ztF (Kt; 1) = e
ztF (Kt) ; (3)
where Yt represents aggregate output, Kt denotes the aggregate capital stock as of the beginning
of period t, and zt is an aggregate technology shock that obeys the stochastic process
zt+1 = zt + t+1; (4)
where  2 (0; 1) and t  i:i:d:

0; 2

.
Markets for capital and labor are perfectly competitive and clear at the prices
rt = e
ztFK (Kt) ; (5)
wt = e
ztF (Kt)  eztFK (Kt)Kt; (6)
respectively, with the stand-in rm making zero-prots in equilibrium.
2.3 Fiscal authority
The scal authority cannot impose lump-sum taxes, but receives revenue by taxing household
income at marginal rate  t. These tax revenues are used to purchase goods that are costlessly
transformed into government consumption goods and provided to households at zero unit-cost.
The scal authority has no outstanding liabilities and cannot issue bonds. As a consequence, the
scal authoritys decisions about taxation and the provision of the public good, decisions made
to maximize the welfare of the representative household, are constrained by the balanced-budget
condition
Gt =  t [(rt   )Kt + wt] ; (7)
where Gt denotes aggregate government consumption.
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2.4 Information, timing, and aggregation
With the current realization for the aggregate technology given by zt, we denote the history of
realizations for aggregate technology up to and including period t by zt = fzigti=0. Similarly,
using xt =

zt kt Kt
0
to denote the economys state at the beginning of period t, we assume
that at the beginning of period t all agents are endowed with the information set given by the
history xt. After entering period t, and having observed xt, the scal authority, rms, and
households make their decisions simultaneously. This timing protocol is also considered by
Cohen and Michel (1988), Ortigueira (2006), and Ambler and Pelgrin (2010) and is relatively
common in the literature on optimal scal policy.2 Our assumptions that all households and all
rms are identical and that they are of unit-mass implies that Kt = kt and Ct = ct in aggregate.
3 Solving for Markov-perfect optimal policy
In this section we present three ways to solve this scal-policy model for a Markov-perfect equi-
librium. More generally, however, this model is quite representative of the scal- and monetary-
policy problems that we are interested in, and the solution methods presented here can be applied
quite broadly to these problems. As we shall see, the value function iteration method that we
describe can also be applied with relative ease to more sophisticated policy problems, ones in-
volving features such as Epstein-Zin preferences, risk-sensitive preferences, and/or occasionally
binding constraints.
3.1 Value function iteration
The problem facing the representative household can be represented by the Bellman equation
v (zt; kt;Kt) = max
ct;kt+1
fu (ct; Gt) + Et [v (zt+1; kt+1;Kt+1)]g ; (8)
with the constraints given by the laws-of-motion for household-level and aggregate capital, re-
spectively,
kt+1 = kt +

1  Gt
eztF (Kt)  Kt

[(eztFK (Kt)  ) kt + eztF (Kt)  eztFK (Kt)Kt]  ct;(9)
Kt+1 = (1  )Kt + eztF (Kt)  Ct  Gt: (10)
2 In the monetary policy literature it is more common to assume that the government has a rst-mover advantage
within the period. See for example Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999) and Woodford (2003). Martin (in press) uses
a model related to Klein, Krusell, and Ríos-Rull (2008) to study the e¤ect on welfare of di¤erent timing protocols.
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taking Gt and Ct as given, and with the initial conditions zt > 0 and kt = Kt > 0, known. Notice
that (5) and (6) have been used so that (9) does not contain prices. Combining the rst-order
condition with respect to consumption, ct, and the Benveniste and Scheinkman (1979) condition,
and aggregating across identical households gives the consumption-Euler equation
uc (Ct; Gt) = Et

uc (Ct+1; Gt+1)

1 +

1  Gt+1
ezt+1F (Kt+1)  Kt+1

(ezt+1FK (Kt+1)  )

:
(11)
The scal authoritys problem is described by the Bellman equation
V (zt;Kt) = max
Gt;Kt+1
fu (Ct; Gt) + Et [V (zt+1;Kt+1)]g ; (12)
with the constraints given by (10) with the initial conditions zt > 0 and Kt > 0, known.
3.2 Equilibrium
A Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium for this model is a collection of household decision rules,
fc (zt; kt;Kt) ; k (zt; kt;Kt)g, a collection of aggregate decision rules, fC(zt;Kt); G(zt;Kt);K(zt;Kt)g,
and a collection of value functions, fv(zt; kt;Kt); V (zt;Kt)g, such that
1. The collection fv(zt; kt;Kt); c(zt; kt;Kt); k(zt; kt;Kt)g solves the households decision prob-
lem described by the Bellman equation, (8), and the constraints, (9) and (10).
2. The collection fV (zt;Kt); C(zt;Kt);K(zt;Kt); G(zt;Kt)g solves the scal authoritys deci-
sion problem described by the Bellman equation, (12), and the constraint, (10).
3. kt = Kt, C(zt;Kt) = c(zt;Kt;Kt), and k(zt;Kt;Kt) = K(zt;Kt).
As we describe later, to solve numerically the scal authoritys problem we conjecture func-
tions for aggregate consumption, C (zt;Kt), aggregate government spending, G (zt;Kt), and the
value function, V (zt;Kt). Based on these conjectured functions and the law-of-motion for ag-
gregate capital, we solve the scal authoritys problem using a hill-climber, obtaining updates
for G (zt;Kt) and V (zt;Kt), the former of which, when combined with (11) delivers an update
for C (zt;Kt). Iterating to convergence we arrive at a Markov perfect equilibrium for this policy
problem.
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3.3 Generalized Euler equations
To solve the model for a Markov-perfect equilibrium using generalized Euler equations, we return
to the scal authoritys decision problem, which is described by the Bellman equation
V (zt;Kt) = max
Gt;Kt+1
fu (Ct; Gt) + Et [V (zt+1;Kt+1)]g ; (13)
and the constraint
Kt+1 = (1  )Kt + eztF (Kt)  Ct  Gt: (14)
The rst-order condition with respect to Gt gives
uG (Ct; Gt) = Et [VK (zt+1;Kt+1)] ; (15)
while the Benveniste-Scheinkman condition yields
VK (zt;Kt) = uC (Ct; Gt)CK (zt;Kt) + uG (Ct; Gt)GK (zt;Kt)
+Et [VK (zt+1;Kt+1)] [1   + eztFK (Kt)  CK (zt;Kt) GK (zt;Kt)] ;(16)
and together (15) and (16) imply the generalized Euler equation
uG (Ct; Gt) = Et [(uC (Ct+1; Gt+1)  uG (Ct+1; Gt+1))CK (zt+1;Kt+1)]
+Et fuG (Ct+1; Gt+1) [1   + ezt+1FK (Kt+1)]g ; (17)
which is generalizedbecause it contains both the level and the derivative of C (zt+1;Kt+1).
To solve for a Markov-perfect equilibrium one needs to solve the system consisting of (14),
(17), and (11) from the households problem, with the process for the aggregate technology shock
given by (4). To solve this system we conjecture functions for aggregate consumption, C (zt;Kt),
aggregate government spending, G (zt;Kt), and iterate on the system until a xed-point is reached.
3.4 Parameterized shadow prices
To solve the model for a time-consistent equilibrium using parameterized shadow prices (Ambler
and Pelgrin, 2010), we formulate the households problem in terms of a Lagrangian
E
1X
t=0
t
"
u (ct; Gt)
+t

kt +

1  GteztF (Kt) Kt

[(eztFK (Kt)  ) kt + eztF (Kt)  eztFK (Kt)Kt]  ct   kt+1
 # ;
(18)
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and derive the rst-order conditions with respect to ct, kt+1, and t, which after aggregating
across identical households (implying t = t) are, respectively,
uC (Ct; Gt) = t; (19)
t = Et

1 +

1  Gt+1
ezt+1F (Kt+1)  Kt+1

(ezt+1FK (Kt+1)  )

t+1

; (20)
Kt+1 = Kt +

1  Gt
eztF (Kt)  Kt

[(eztFK (Kt)  ) kt + eztF (Kt)  eztFK (Kt)Kt]  Ct:(21)
Now recognizing that the shadow price t will be a function of only zt andKt in a simultaneous-
move time-consistent equilibrium, the scal authoritys problem is formulated using the La-
grangian
E
1X
t=0
t

u (Ct; Gt) + t (uC (Ct; Gt)   (zt;Kt))
+	t [(1  )Kt + eztF (Kt)  Ct  Gt  Kt+1]

: (22)
The rst-order conditions from the scal authoritys decision problem yield
uC (Ct; Gt) = 	t   uCC (Ct; Gt) t; (23)
uG (Ct; Gt) = 	t   uCG (Ct; Gt) t; (24)
	t = Et [(1   + ezt+1FK (Kt+1))	t+1   K (zt+1;Kt+1) t+1] ; (25)
uC (Ct; Gt) = Et

1 +

1  Gt+1
ezt+1F (Kt+1)  Kt+1

(ezt+1FK (Kt+1)  )

uC (Ct+1; Gt+1)

;(26)
Kt+1 = (1  )Kt + eztF (Kt)  Ct  Gt: (27)
The time-consistent equilibrium is now obtained by solving (23) (27), and (4) using para-
meterized expectations (Marcet and Lorenzoni, 1999), to approximate the expectation terms in
(25) and (26).
4 Solving the model
In this section we solve the model presented in Section 2 using the three methods discussed in
Section 3. For this exercise, we assume that the representative households momentary utility
function is of the additively separable form
u (ct; Gt) =
c1 t   1
1   + 
G1 t   1
1   ; (28)
where f; ; g > 0, and that the production function is
Yt = e
ztKt ; (29)
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where  2 (0; 1).
Our parameterization of the model follows Ambler and Pelgrin (2010) and is summarized in
Table 1.3
Table 1: Benchmark Parameterization
Parameter Value Interpretation
 0:987 Household discount factor
 1:000 Utility curvature of private consumption
 0:300 Utility weight on government services
 1:000 Utility curvature of government services
 0:300 Capital-share of output
 0:050 Depreciation rate
 0:950 Persistence of technology shock
 0:030 Standard deviation of technology shock
To compute the Markov-perfect equilibrium using value function iteration (VFI) and gen-
eralized Euler equations (GEE) we use Chebyshev polynomials to approximate the conjectured
functions. In the case of GEE, the procedure requires introducing polynomials to approximate
the decision rules for consumption, C (zt;Kt), and government spending, G (zt;Kt), while VFI
requires, in addition, a polynomial to approximate the value function, V (zt;Kt). For a generic
function, X (zt;Kt), these polynomial approximations take the form
X (zt;Kt) '
nzX
j=1
nkX
i=0
wij i (Kt)  j (zt) ; (30)
where  i (Kt) represents the ith term of the Chebyshev polynomial in aggregate capital,  j (zt)
represents the jth term of the Chebyshev polynomial in aggregate technology, nk and nz represent
the orders of the Chebyshev polynomials, and wij represents the Chebyshev weights.
For VFI, at each node for capital and technology we use a Newton-based hill climber to solve
V (zt;Kt) = max
Gt;Kt+1
"
C (zt;Kt; Gt)
1    1
1   + 
G1 t   1
1   + Et [V (zt+1;Kt+1)]
#
; (31)
subject to4
Kt+1 = (1  )Kt + eztKt   C (zt;Kt; Gt) Gt; (32)
3There is a typo in Ambler and Pelgrin (2010, Table 1) in which their depreciation rate is reported to be 0.025.
4When optimizing the Bellman equation we substitute the constraint into the continuation value and maximize
with respect to Gt.
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computing conditional expectations using Gauss-Hermite quadrature. This maximization yields
the policy rule for government spending, G (zt;Kt), and the associated value function, V (zt;Kt).
From G (zt;Kt) and C (zt;Kt; Gt) we compute C (zt;Kt). For GEE, at each node for capital
and technology we use direct iteration over (14), (17), and (11), again computing conditional
expectations using Gauss-Hermite quadrature. For both VFI and GEE, the weights in the
Chebyshev polynomials are constructed through Chebyshev-regression with capital and technol-
ogy constrained to the intervals Kt 2 [5; 15] and zt 2
h
  32
1 2 ;
32
1 2
i
. To solve the model under
its benchmark parameterization we set nz = 6 and nk = 9, and use 50 Chebyshev nodes for the
capital stock and 21 Chebyshev nodes for aggregate technology. For the quadrature step, 21
Gauss-Hermite nodes were used.
For the parameterized shadow prices (PSP) method we parameterized the shadow prices
according to5
 (zt;Kt) ' e (zt;Kt) = e(1+2 ln(Kt)+3zt); (33)
	(zt;Kt) ' e	(zt;Kt) = e(1+2 ln(Kt)+3zt); (34)
and performed Monte Carlo integration using 1; 000; 000 simulated observations.
To evaluate the accuracy of each solution we computed the Euler-equation errors (Judd, 1992)
EE (zt;Kt) = 1 
n
Et
h
C (zt+1;Kt+1)
 

1 +

1  G(zt+1;Kt+1)ezt+1Kt+1 Kt+1
  
ezt+1K 1t+1   
io  1
C (zt;Kt)
;
(35)
employing uniform grids for capital and technology over their intervals and using 1000 grid-points
in each dimension.
4.1 Results comparison
Table 2 presents some summary statistics from the solutions; the stochastic steady state values
were computing by simulating data (1; 000; 000 observations) from each solution and taking the
unconditional mean.
5Equations (33) and (34) describe Ambler and Pelgrins rst-order approximation; they also consider a second-
order approximation, obtaining very similar results.
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Table 2: Stochastic steady state solutions and accuracy
Variable VFI GEE PSP
Output 1:92262 1:92262 1:92262
Consumption 1:15960 1:15960 1:15959
Government spend. 0:32907 0:32906 0:32910
Investment 0:43396 0:43396 0:43394
Capital 8:67923 8:67921 8:67889
log10 kEEk1  6:75093  7:41723  2:06101
For the PSP method, the approximated shadow prices that we obtained were
e (zt;Kt) = e(0:923 0:495 ln(Kt) 0:473zt); (36)e	(zt;Kt) = e(1:085 0:544 ln(Kt) 0:457zt); (37)
which are very similar to the rst-order solution presented in Ambler and Pelgrin (2010, Table
2).6
Comparing the solutions shown in Table 2, it is clear that the three procedures produce very
similar results, at least in terms of the models stochastic steady state. To the extent that there
are di¤erences, however, it is the PSP method whose results di¤er, which is consistent with the
PSP method being generally less accurate and having larger Euler-equation errors.7 It should
be emphasized, however, that the di¤erences among the three solutions are minor, a nding
that carries over to the unconditional densities shown in Figure 1. Indeed, looking at Figure
1, although PSP produces Euler-equation errors (panel C) that are somewhat larger than either
VFI or GEE, because these errors are not particularly systematic (such as being mostly of the
same sign) they largely wash-out when computing the unconditional densities (panels D I). To
the extent that di¤erences between PSP and the other two methods are apparent, they reside
chiey in the decision rule for government spending (panel B), where it is apparent that PSP
tends to understate government spending when capital is large.8
6The results that we obtain from a second-order version in which equations (33) and (34) also contain the
squares of ln (Kt) and zt and the interaction between ln (Kt) and zt, are very similar to those presented in Table
2 and Figure 1.
7The Euler-equation errors presented in Figure 1 di¤er from those presented in Ambler and Pelgrin (2010). We
suspect that the source of this di¤erence resides in the procedure used to numerically integrate the technology
shock. If we simply set the technology shock to its unconditional mean when computing the Euler-equation errors,
then we obtain results very similar to theirs.
8The decision rules for shown in Figure 1 (panels A and B), depict consumption and government spending,
respectively, as a function of capital, holding zt = 0.
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Figure 1: Comparing solutions
4.2 The numerical accuracy of the PSP approach
We saw in Figure 1 that the PSP solution method obtained using parameterized expectations was
less accurate in terms of Euler equation errors that either GEE or VFI. To explore the reason
for this decline in accuracy, we compute an alternative PSP solution (PSP-alt) in which the
12
approximating function is a Chebyshev polynomial and expectations are computed using Gauss-
Hermite quadrature rather than Monte Carlo integration. For PSP-alt, therefore, we replace
(33) and (34) with polynomials in the form of (30), and use the same grid as used for VFI and
GEE. The results are shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Numerical accuracy of PSP solution method
It is clear from Figure 2 that PSP-alt remains inferior in terms of Euler-equation accuracy
than either GEE or VFI, but improves upon the benchmark PSP-solution described in Section 3.3
(which follows Ambler and Pelgrin, 2010). This implies, therefore, that the decline in numerical
accuracy associated with PSP stems less from the choice of approximating function or from the
13
method of integration, and more on the object being approximated. Specically, comparing PSP-
alt with GEE the essential di¤erence is that GEE approximates the decision rules for consumption
and government spending whereas PSP-alt approximates convolutions of these decision rules as
part of a more general function.
5 More sophisticated policy-problems
In this section we consider two policy problems that are more sophisticated than the benchmark
model considered above. The rst of these policy problems introduces a constraint on government
spending (as a share of output), a constraint that is occasionally binding in that it binds in
some regions of the state-space, but not in others. In many respects, this occasionally binding
constraint is not unlike those that appear in monetary policy models with a zero-lower bound
on the nominal interest rate or in models with occasionally binding collateral constraints. The
second of these policy problems assumes that the scal authority is a risk-sensitive decisionmaker.
We consider these two variations on the benchmark model because they each pose problems for
GEE and PSP particularly risk-sensitivity but can be accommodated easily through VFI. In
particular, although models containing inequality constraints like that described in section 5.1 can
be solved using the PSP and GEE solution methods, using the techniques described in Christiano
and Fisher (2000), for example, these techniques are somewhat more di¤cult to implement than
simply imposing box-constraints within a hill-climber, which is all that is required for VFI. In
regard to models with risk-sensitive preferences, rst-order methods such as GEE and PSP are
generally inappropriate for such problems precisely because they do not retain the level of the
value function.
5.1 Constraints on government spending or taxes
Using VFI it is straightforward to impose inequality constraints on government spending by
employing a constrained hill-climber when optimizing the scal authoritys value function with
respect to Gt. Accordingly, if one wants to constrain government spending as a share of output,
such as
he
ztKt  Gt  leztKt ; (38)
where h > l > 0, then one simply determines the upper and lower bound on Gt for each
node in the state space and determines G (zt;Kt) and V (zt;Kt) using constrained optimization.
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Inequality constraints on the tax rate can be similarly accommodated. For example, to constrain
 t to reside in the interval  t 2 [ l; h], we translate this inequality constraint on the tax rate
into one on government spending, as per
h (e
ztKt   Kt)  Gt   l (eztKt   Kt) ; (39)
and then, as before, maximize the value function at each node in the state space using a con-
strained hill-climber.
For illustrative purposes, the model that we consider is one in which government spending
is constrained to be no less than 16:5 percent of output, with this percent chosen so that the
spending constraint would bind occasionally, but not predominantly. We refer to this model as
the scally constrained model.
5.2 Risk-sensitive preferences
VFI can also be used to solve decision problems in which the policymaker has risk-sensitive
preferences, perhaps motivated by ambiguity aversion or by an aversion to model uncertainty
(Hansen and Sargent, 2008). In place of (12), a risk-sensitive scal authority will conduct scal
policy based on the Bellman equation
V (zt;Kt) = max
Gt;Kt+1
"
C (zt;Kt; Gt)
1    1
1   + 
G1 t   1
1   +


ln
h
Ete[V (zt+1;Kt+1)]
i#
; (40)
where  < 0 is the risk-sensitivity parameter and the constraint continues to be given by (10). An
application of LHôpitalsrule establishes that (12) is restored in the limit as  " 0 while the e¤ects
of  < 0 are to distort the continuation value in the Bellman equation, a distortion arising from the
scal authoritys aversion to risky life-time utility. Because the value function is an object that
VFI retains and delivers, risk-sensitive preferences are straightforward to analyze. To illustrate
this point, and to examine the e¤ects that risk-sensitive preferences have on Markov-perfect
scal policy, we consider a decision problem for which the scal authoritys Bellman equation is
described by (40) with  =  1:0. We refer to this model as the risk-sensitive preferences model.
5.3 First-best
As a baseline against which to contrast the Markov-perfect equilibria obtained from the bench-
mark model, the scally constrained model, and the risk-sensitive preferences model, we also solve
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for the rst-best equilibrium in the benchmark model. To compute this rst-best equilibrium we
formulate the decision problem for the scal authority in terms of the Bellman equation
V (zt;Kt) = maxfCt;Gt;Kt+1g
"
C1    1
1   + 
G1 t   1
1   + Et [V (zt+1;Kt+1)]
#
; (41)
with the constraint given by (10) and with technology evolving according to (4). Although there
are two choice variables, this is a standard dynamic programming problem and can be solved
using the VFI strategy described above. For the benchmark model, the rst-best equilibrium
must satisfy the resource constraint
Kt+1 = (1  )Kt + eztKt   Ct  Gt; (42)
and the rst-order conditions
C t = Et

C t+1
 
1   + ezt+1K 1t+1

; (43)
C t = G
 
t : (44)
We use (43) to construct the Euler-equation errors in our accuracy test, which, because it is not
imposed in obtaining the solution, leads to a relatively stringent test of accuracy.
5.4 Results
In this section we solve for the Markov-perfect equilibrium of the benchmark model, the scally
constrained model, and the risk-sensitive preferences model. We contrast these equilibria with
the rst-best equilibrium obtained from the benchmark model. Table 3 and Figure 2 contain
a summary of the main results. The deterministic steady state results shown in Table 3
correspond to the steady state in a Markov-perfect equilibrium of a deterministic version of the
benchmark model. However, because risk-sensitivity generates no risk-adjustment when the
model is deterministic and because the government spending constraint that we impose in the
scally constrained model does not bind at the deterministic steady state, the deterministic steady
state values reported apply equally to the scally constrained model and to the risk-sensitive
preferences model.
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Table 3: Steady state solutions and numerical accuracy
Variable Deterministic Benchmark Fiscally const. Risk-sensitive First-best
Output 1:90236 1:92262 1:9223076 1:92869 1:96881
Consumption 1:15008 1:15960 1:1587733 1:19650 1:15329
Government spend. 0:32575 0:32907 0:3298144 0:29366 0:34599
Investment 0:42653 0:43396 0:4337198 0:43853 0:46953
Capital 8:53053 8:67923 8:6744408 8:77060 9:39064
log10 kEEk1  7:46797  6:75093  4:97567  7:03006  4:75445
Table 3 shows that the deterministic steady state for capital is just over 8:53. Allowing
for stochastic aggregate technology, as per the benchmark model, the (stochastic) steady state
for capital rises to about 8:68. This rise in steady-state capital occurs through a standard
precautionary saving motive whereby risk-averse households increase their saving and accumulate
capital as a bu¤er to self-insure against adverse technology shocks. Consistent with a higher
steady state capital stock, the steady state values for output, consumption, and investment are
all higher in the benchmark model than they are in its deterministic counterpart.
The constraint that government spending as a share of output be no smaller than 0:165 has
little e¤ect on the models stochastic steady state, which is very similar to that of the benchmark
model, but it does lead to a decline in numerical accuracy. Nonetheless, with the log10 of the max-
imum Euler-equation error at about  5 the maximal solution error amounts to about one dollar
out of every one hundred thousand dollars spent, which certainly seems acceptable. Comparing
the benchmark model to the risk-sensitive preferences model, it is clear that the scal author-
itys risk-sensitivity is having a profound e¤ect on scal policy. Specically, at the (stochastic)
steady state the risk-sensitive scal authority chooses less government spending than does the
scal authority in the benchmark model. With less government spending the risk-sensitive scal
authority also imposes a smaller income tax rate, reducing some of the disincentive householdss
face to accumulate capital. As a consequence, the (stochastic) steady state for capital in the
risk-sensitive preferences model is almost 8:8, somewhat higher than in the benchmark model.
Table 3 also presents summary statistics for the rst-best equilibrium, quantifying the e¤ects of
distortionary taxation and the time-inconsistency problem that these distortions produce.
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Figure 3: Solution and accuracy
Where Table 3 presents information about steady state outcomes, Figure 3 presents the con-
sumption function, the government spending function, the densities of the key model-variables,
and additional information about numerical accuracy. As earlier, we construct the densities by
simulating data from each solution, we report the decision rules for consumption and government
spending holding zt = 0, and we use (35) to compute the Euler-equation errors (suitably modied
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in the case of the rst-best equilibrium).
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the consumption functions for the benchmark model and the scally
constrained model are very similar. The di¤erences between these two models are reected more
prominently in their respective government spending functions, where the constraint on govern-
ment spending binds occasionally to force higher government spending in the scally constrained
economy. The e¤ects of risk-sensitivity are evident in both the consumption function and the
government spending function. Because the risk-sensitive scal authority is especially concerned
about risk, she wishes households to build up a bu¤er-stock of capital, keeping government spend-
ing and hence income taxes low in order to encourage households to do so. Of course, the income
e¤ect associated with the lower lifetime tax liability (the model is Ricardian) induces households
to also consume more, leading households to consume more in the risk-sensitive model relative
to the benchmark model.
Interestingly, each of the models produces similar densities for output and, to a lesser extent,
for consumption. The four models di¤er importantly, however, with respect to the densities for
investment, capital, government spending, and government spending as a share of output. With
distortionary taxes, government spending is too low, both in absolute terms and as a share of
output, relative to the rst-best equilibrium. The constraint on government spending in the
scally constrained economy is evident in the density for government spending as a share of
output, but has relatively little e¤ect on the density for government spending itself.
Having shown the densities for output, consumption, etc, in Figure 3, Figure 4 presents
the impulse response functions for the key model variables following a positive one standard
deviation technology shock; Figure 5 displays analogous responses, but for a negative one standard
deviation technology shock. Looking at Figure 4, there are notable di¤erences in how the various
models respond, particularly in regard to government spending and consumption. In the scally
constrained economy, with output rising in response to the technology shock the constraint on
government spending binds pushing up government spending at the expense (primarily) of lower
private consumption. At the same time, interestingly, the benchmark equilibrium, the risk-
sensitive equilibrium, and the rst-best equilibrium respond similarly to the shock.
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Figure 4: Responses to a positive 1 s.d. technology shock
In response to a negative technology shock, Figure 5 reveals some asymmetries relative to the
responses to a positive shock shown in Figure 4. In particular, unlike a positive technology shock,
the constraint on government spending does not bind following a negative technology shock and
there are greater di¤erences between the rst-best equilibrium and the benchmark model. Other
than for the scally constrained economy, for which there is a clear asymmetry in the government
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spending response, the modelsresponses are relatively symmetric
Figure 5: Responses to a negative 1 s.d. technology shock
To better identify asymmetries in the impulse response functions we plot in Figure 6 the sum of
the responses to the positive and negative shock for each variable. To the extent that each model
is asymmetric the sum of the responses di¤ers from zero. Looking at Figure 6 (panel E) we see
a notable asymmetry in the capital stocks reponses to technology shocks, with this asymmetry
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propagated through capital role as a state variable into the remaining variables. In addition to
this asymmetry, Figure 5 also reveals the asymmetries present in the scally constrained economy
and shows how the occasionally binding constraint on government spending induces asymmetric
behavior in consumption and investment.
Figure 6: Impulse response asymmetries
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6 Discussion
The models solved above are relatively small in that they contain only one endogenous state
variable and one shock. With only two state variables and the need to integrate over a single
shock these models can be solved relatively quickly by all three methods, although with varying
accuracy. Excluding coding time, which is an important consideration, GEE and PSP-alt were
the quickest, followed by VFI and then PSP.9 However, each of these methods su¤ers from the
curse of dimensionality. As a consequence, solving larger models, ones containing a handful of
state variables or more, can be very time-consuming. For such models, it may be advantageous
to employ complete polynomials rather than tensor-product polynomials or to use sparse-grid
methods (Smolyak, 1963), as described in Malin, Krueger, and Kubler (2011), for example, or
monomial-methods (Pichler, 2011).
7 Conclusion
This paper has presented and compared three methods for computing Markov-perfect optimal
policies in nonlinear business cycle models. Of these methods, two were based on Euler equations
while the third was based on value function iteration. We illustrated these solution methods by
applying them to a canonical business cycle model of government-good provision in which a scal
authority must determine optimally the provision of government goods, subject to distortionary
taxation, a balanced-budget constraint, and while lacking a commitment technology. For this
benchmark model we found that all three methods worked well, that the use of generalized Euler
equations and value function iteration gave essentially identical results, and that the parameter-
ized shadow price method was the less accurate of the three. We further showed that the value
function iteration solution method could easily be extended to accommodate model features such
as risk-sensitive preferences and certain forms of occasionally binding constraints, such as bounds
on government spending or the tax rate.
Although our application focused on scal policy, many economic decision problems can be
tackled using the solution procedures described in this paper. In particular, problems relating to
monetary policy design, both with and without a zero-bound on nominal interest rates, monetary
9This ordering simply reects our experience with these methods, without attempting to optimize them for
speed. A comprehensive study of solution times, one that optimized the solution methods, conditioned them
upon identical initial conditions (to the extent possible), and the requirement that they produce the same level of
accuracy, is beyond the scope of this paper.
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and scal policy coordination, exchange rate management, and international lending. These
solution procedures can also be used to examine the e¤ects of risk-sensitivity on allocations and
asset prices in economies where policymakers cannot commit.
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